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RODNEY A. SMOLLA • 
STEPHEN A. SMITH•• 
Propaganda, Xenophobia, and. 
the First Amendment 
THE Academy Award for Best Short Documentary of 1982 was awarded to If You Love This Planet, produced by the National 
Film Board of Canada (NFBC). The film depicted an anti-nuclear 
weapons speech given at Plattsburg, New York, by Dr. Helen 
Caldicott, President of the Boston-based Physicians for Social Re-
sponsibility. The film used newsreel footage of the dropping of 
atomic bombs on Japan and clips from World War II Department 
of Defense propaganda movies, featuring none other than Ronald 
Reagan. A second film produced by the NFBC, Acid Rain: Re-
quiem or Recovery?, also generated critical acclaim in 1982, receiv-
ing the award of excellence from the American Society of Foresters. 
Acid Rain documented the extensive environmental damage caused 
by precipitation containing sulfuric and nitric acids produced from 
the burning of fossil fuels. 
While critical praise brought considerable public attention to 
these films, the United States Government was unwilling to permit 
them to be exhibited raw and uncensored. Invoking the heavy bu-
reaucratic machinery of the Foreign Agents Registration Act ("the 
Act"), 1 the Chief of the Registration Unit of the Internal Security 
Section of the Criminal Division of the United States Depart~ent of 
Justice (move over, George Orwell!) notified the NFBC that these 
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Marshall· Wythe School of Law. Support for Professor Smolla's research on this Article 
was provided in part by The Annenberg Washington Program for Communications 
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** Associate Professor of Communication, University of Arkansas. Professor 
Smith's research on this Article was conducted as a Visiting Fellow at the LaFollette 
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin, Madison. The authors wish to 
thank Ms. Josee M. Desrochers for her valuable assistance. 
I Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
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two movies, along with a third Canadian environmental film, Acid 
From Heaven, had been classified as "political propaganda." The 
Justice Department's letter informed the NFBC that the label iden-
tifying the films as "political propaganda should be ... placed at the 
beginning as a (film) leader and projected long enough to permit 
audiences to read it."2 The letter further informed the NFBC that 
pursuant to the Act, the NFBC was required to provide the Depart-
ment of Justice with the names of all major distributors of the films 
and with a list of all specific groups and theaters that requested the 
films for viewing. 3 
In Meese v. Keene,4 the United States Supreme Court held that 
the compelled labeling of these films as political propaganda and the 
various registration, filing, and disclosure requirements of the For-
eign Agents Registration Act did not violate the first amendment. 5 
Two themes dominated the Supreme Court's opinion. First, the 
Court found that the term "political propaganda" was a neutral la-
bel which communicated no negative connotations.6 Second, the 
Court found that the labeling was not a suppression of speech but 
rather a mere act of governmental speech that actually enhanced 
first amendment values by placing more information before the con-
sumer7 - a sort of "truth in propagandizing" statute. 
In a summer filled with other momentous constitutional distrac-
tions, Meese v. Keene did not dominate the legal spotlight. It was, 
nevertheless, a first amendment decision of enormous doctrinal and 
cultural importance, touching upon subjects the Court had rarely 
addressed in the past. Among those subjects were the constitutional 
limits (if any) on the power of the United States to monitor and 
classify incoming speech from the world marketplace of ideas as 
"propaganda" and further to require that distributors inform the 
government as to the identity of those groups and theaters that wish 
2 See Caulfield, U.S. Labels 3 Canadian Films as Propaganda, Los Angeles Times, 
Feb. 25, 1983, part 1, at 27, cols. 2-3 (quoting letter from Joseph Clarkson, Chief of the 
Justice Department's Foreign Agents Registration Unit, to the NFBC (Jan. 19, 1983)). 
3 /d. See also 22 U.S.C. § 614 (1982). 
4 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987). 
5 For those legal realists counting judicial noses in the five-to-three decision, retired 
Justice Powell was in the majority. Justice Antonin Scalia did not participate, appar-
ently because he authored a related court of appeals decision which upheld the Act as 
applied to these films. See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Justice 
Scalia's analysis in Block was virtually identical to Justice Stevens' analysis for the 
Court in Keene, so his vote clearly would have made the Keene case a 6-3 decision. 
Judge Scalia's decision in Block was joined by Judge Robert Bork. 
6 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1872. 
7 /d. at 1871. 
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to exhibit this material. Also addressed was the related power of 
the United States to "propagandize" on its own behalf by requiring 
that such speech bear the label "foreign political propaganda" when 
distributed to American citizens. 
This Article examines Meese v. Keene in both legal and cultural 
terms, critiquing the Court's analysis in light of the legislative his-
tory of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the events surrounding 
the labeling of these films as propaganda, the empirical evidence 
concerning the Court's assumptions about the meaning of the word 
"propaganda," and its assumptions about the very nature of the 
communication process. The Article concludes that the central 
premise of Keene is untenable. Contrary to the Court's labored at-
tempt to cleanse the Foreign Agents Registration Act by declaring 
the term "political propaganda" neutral, the legislative history of 
the Act, the present cultural climate, and the empirical evidence 
concerning the term "propaganda" all overwhelmingly expose the 
label as a pejorative term selected to negatively influence viewers 
and perhaps even dissuade them from viewing the film at all. 
Further, this Article asserts that Keene confuses the right of the 
United States Government to speak out as a participant in the mar-
ketplace of ideas with the right of the government to regulate the 
ideas of other participants in the market. When the government 
imposes labeling and disclosure requirements on another's speech, it 
is no longer a mere participant. 
Finally, from a broader perspective, Meese v. Keene capitulates to 
a recurring weakness in American culture, a reflexive xenophobic 
tendency to paternalistically shelter Americans from "foreign" or 
"alien" speech. Thus, as part of this reflexive tendency, the Article 
concludes that the Foreign Agents Registration Act impermissibly 
regulates speech. The Act is unabashedly aimed at the suppression 
of foreign speech perceived as undesirable by the government. 
Moreover, it is predicated on the assumption that in the world mar-
ketplace of ideas, the cornerstone of all modem first amendment 
thinking - "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"8 - does not 
apply. 
8 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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I 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 
OPINION 
A. The Interplay Between the Court's Standing Analysis and the 
Merits of the Case 
A litigant's standing to assert a claim should not be confused 
with whether the litigant has a valid claim on the merits. 9 Barry 
Keene, a member of the California State Senate, initiated the litiga-
tion in Meese v. Keene. Keene wanted to exhibit the Canadian films 
without complying with the statutory labeling and disclosure re-
quirements. The Supreme Court held that Barry Keene had stand-
ing to challenge the application of the Foreign Affairs Registration 
Act to his exhibition of the films. 10 In so holding, the Court was 
forced to face a number of issues concerning the practical operation 
of the Act. In weighing those issues, the Court displayed an admi-
rable realism and a pragmatic sensitivity to the working of the com-
munication process. When the Court turned to the merits, 
however, the realism that had guided its standing determination 
was suddenly cut adrift, as the Court indulged in assumptions about 
the Act and the marketplace of ideas inconsistent with the judg-
ments it had necessarily accepted in finding that Barry Keene had 
standing. Keene is thus a rare case in which the Court's standing 
analysis may properly be invoked to shed light upon and critique its 
decision on the merits. 
The Court's standing analysis was grounded in a distinction be-
tween "subjective" and "objective" chills on the exercise of first 
amendment rights. 11 The Court drew on its 1972 decision in Laird 
v. Tatum, 12 where it denied standing to plaintiffs who alleged that 
Army intelligence-gathering operations chilled the exercise of their 
first amendment rights because the Army might, in the future, make 
unlawful use of its data. The Court stated that if Barry Keene "had 
merely alleged that the appellation deterred him by exercising a 
chilling effect on the exercise of his First Amendment rights, he 
would not have standing to seek its invalidation." 13 Keene did not 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
u.s. 669 (1973). 
10 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1867-69. 
II Jd. 
12 408 U.S. I (1972). 
13 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1867. 
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claim that he was unable to receive or exhibit the films at all. 14 He 
did claim that because the films bore the official stamp of the United 
States as foreign political propaganda, Keene's "personal, political, 
and professional reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain 
reelection and to practice his profession would be impaired." 15 This 
reputational damage, the Court conceded, went beyond "subjective 
chill" and established "cognizable injury." 16 
While the Court was willing to find that Keene satisfied the "ob-
jective chill" requirement, the analysis itself creates a curious asym-
metry in the Court's treatment of reputational injury. The 
subjective/objective distinction adopted by the Court paralleled 
precisely the traditional common-law rule governing actions for def-
amation. 17 Mere "subjective" injury-personal humiliation, embar-
rassment, or emotional distress-was insufficient to support an 
action for defamation under conventional common-law analysis. 
Rather, the plaintiff was required to establish "objective" injury to 
his or her reputation before any recovery was permitted. 18 The 
Supreme Court held in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 19 however, that 
nothing in the first amendment prohibited the states from rejecting 
or modifying the common-law rule. Thus, a "private figure" defa-
mation action involving "issues of public concern" may be predi-
cated on mere subjective emo~ional injury alone. 2° Furthermore, in 
defamation cases involving "private figures" and "issues of private 
concern," the Court has permitted a state to award "presumed 
damages," a common-law device where no evidence of reputational 
injury is required to support an award for compensatory damages. 21 
In none of these cases in which plaintiffs claimed purely subjec-
tive, or even presumed injury, was standing even thought of as an 
14Jd. 
IS /d. (quoting Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983)). 
l6Jd. 
17 See generally R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9.06[4] (1986). 
18 See, e.g., Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25, 660 S.W.2d 933 
(1983); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982); France v. St. 
Clare's Hosp. & Health Center, 82 A.D.2d 1, 441 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981); Salomone v. 
MacMillan Publishing Co., 77 A.D.2d 501, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1980). 
19 424 u.s. 448 (1976). 
20 !d. at 460. 
21 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). 
The Dun & Bradstreet litigation began in the Vermont state courts, where federal article 
III standing rules do not apply; the substantive law decision on presumed damages, 
however, would apply to any libel case involving private figures and private speech, 
including a diversity action brought in federal court. See also R. SMOLLA, supra note 
17, § 9.05[2] (presumed damages constitutionally permissible). 
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issue. Indeed, to disqualify litigants on standing grounds would be 
foreign to modem standing theory. It would confuse the contours 
of the substantive law cause of action with the procedural limita-
tions governing constitutional adjudication. A state may choose to 
create a tort action grounded in psychic injury whether it is labeled 
invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, or defamation. 
If a plaintiff brings that action in federal court in a diversity suit, no 
federal court would dream of dismissing the case for lack of stand-
ing, for "injury" in the sense required by the Constitution to confer 
standing clearly exists.22 Whether that injury is sufficient to state a 
cause of action is a question of substantive law. The first amend-
ment is part of that substantive law determination; it is brought into 
the litigation by defendants as a shield or defense, with the hope of 
placing limits on the plaintiff's state-created cause of action. 
Barry Keene, however, used the first amendment as a sword. 
When the tables are thus turned and the first amendment is impli-
cated not as a defense but as the substantive law giving rise to the 
plaintiff's claim, surely the standing rules ought not change. If sub-
jective injury is sufficient to support standing when the plaintiff is 
defamed by Time Magazine,23 it ought to be sufficient to support 
standing when the plaintiff is in effect defamed by the government. 
Therefore, the Keene Court's subjective/objective dichotomy was 
not truly a proper element of its standing analysis at all but a sub-
stantive law determination. In short, it was a judgment on the mer-
its of the first amendment claim that the first amendment provides 
no shelter against mere subjective injury, at least in the factual con-
text of Keene's lawsuit. 
The Court thus forcibly channeled all of Keene's litigation hopes 
into the assertion that the government's labeling of these films as 
propaganda caused him objective injury.24 Even so restricted, how-
ever, Keene was able to prevail by establishing an overwhelmingly 
persuasive record that the government's actions did objectively chill 
his first amendment rights. He introduced Gallup poll evidence 
which concluded that the charge of having exhibited political prop-
aganda "would have a seriously adverse effect on a California State 
Legislature candidate's chances [for election] if this charge were 
raised during a campaign. " 25 The Supreme Court accepted the dis-
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
23 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
24 Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1867-68 (1987). 
25 Jd. at 1867 n.7. 
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trict court's finding that the Foreign Agents Registration Act "puts 
the plaintiff to the Hobsen's choice of foregoing the use of the three 
Canadian films for the exposition of his own views or suffering an 
injury to his reputation."26 The Court further quoted with approval 
the assertion that the label "raises the hackles of suspicion on the 
part of the audience. " 27 
The Court noted that Keene theoretically could have blunted this 
harm by providing viewers with counter information, such as the 
fact that one of the films had won an Oscar.28 That information, 
however, would not diminish Keene's injury. The Keene Court 
cited Lamont v. Postmaster General, 29 in which the Court did not 
question a litigant's standing to challenge a statute requiring the 
Postmaster General to hold all "communist political propaganda" 
originating abroad and not release it to the addressee in the absence 
of a written request to the Post Office. The Keene Court empha-
sized that just as "[t]he necessity of going on the record as request-
ing this political literature constituted an injury to Lamont in his 
exercise of First Amendment rights,"3° Keene would likewise "have 
to take affirmative steps at each film showing to prevent public for-
mation of an association between 'political propaganda' and his 
reputation."31 Moreover, even these measures "would be ineffective 
among those citizens who shun the film as 'political 
propaganda.' " 32 
Finally, the Court held that Keene satisfied the standing require-
ment that his injury be "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly 
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested re-
lief."33 The Court easily traced Keene's injury to the actions of the 
government "because the Department of Justice has placed the le-
gitimate force of its criminal enforcement powers behind the label 
of 'political propaganda.' " 34 
In sum, even though the Court artificially restricted Keene's 
standing position by disqualifying all of his "subjective" injury, it 
26 /d. at 1868 (quoting Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 1985)). 
27 /d. (quoting Brief for Keene at 15 n.14, Keene, 619 F. Supp. 1111). 
28Jd. 
29 381 u.s. 301 (1965). 
30 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1868. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. at 1868-69. 
33 /d. at 1869 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). See also Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 u.s. 464, 472 (1982). 
34 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1869. 
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nevertheless found the evidence of "objective" mJury persuasive. 
The Court's standing decision was ultimately grounded on a realis-
tic and candid assessment of how the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act affected the marketplace of ideas in Keene's case. The Act re-
sulted in objective, observable injury to Keene by diminishing his 
reputation or by forcing him to take affirmative steps to attempt to 
minimize that reputational damage. All of this injury, the Court 
held, was traceable to the official weight of the United States De-
partment of Justice standing behind the opprobrious label. 35 
B. The Court's Analysis on the Merits - Words in Wonderland 
When the Court turned from standing to the merits, it abandoned 
the view that the government's use of the propaganda label should 
be evaluated in terms of its practical impact on the marketplace of 
ideas; instead, the Court went out of its way to both avoid reading 
the legislative history of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and to 
employ a strained and bizarre analysis of the communication pro-
cess. The Keene Court attempted to sanitize the Act's use of the 
term "propaganda" by transforming the statute into a neutral and 
innocuous form of "truth in political advertising" legislation. The 
Court's analysis is plausible only if American society has become 
credulous beyond redemption. The government, like Humpty 
Dumpty, would like to say, "When I use a word, it means just what 
I choose it to mean- neither more nor less."36 
The Court employed an extraordinary dichotomy between the 
meaning of the word "propaganda," as popularly understood by the 
recipients of the government's speech, 37 and the intended meaning 
of the word when employed by the government as speaker. 38 
"Political propaganda," the Court maintained, has two meanings. 39 
Citing the statement in the record from NBC News Correspondent 
Edwin Newman, the Court conceded: "In popular parlance many 
people assume that propaganda is a form of slanted, misleading 
speech that does not merit serious attention and that proceeds from 
a concern for advancing the narrow interests of the speaker rather 
35 ld. 
36 LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 
174 (R. Greened. 1965). 
37 The Court's standing analysis had already credited evidence on the record before it 
that "political propaganda" was a negative term. See supra text accompanying notes 
13-34. 
38 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1869, 1872-73. 
39Jd. at 1869. 
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than from a devotion to the truth."40 In addition to this "narrower, 
pejorative definition,"41 the Court maintained that propaganda has 
a second "broad, neutral" definition that "includes advocacy mater-
ials that are completely accurate and merit the closest attention and 
the highest respect."42 The Court held that the Foreign Agents Re-
gistration Act did not violate the first amendment because the latter 
statutory definition was neutral.43 
The Court gave three reasons for its decision. First, unlike the 
scheme struck down in Lamont v. Postmaster General,44 which also 
involved propaganda, the Court argued that the Foreign Agents Re-
gistration Act involved no ''physical detention of the materials."45 
Congress "did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of ad-
vocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from 
conversion, confusion, or deceit."46 To the contrary, the Court ar-
gued, the Act merely compelled disclosure, providing the "con-
sumer" with additional information, thus enhancing first 
amendment values; "[i]ronically, it is the injunction entered by the 
District Court that withholds information from the public. " 47 The 
Court condemned the district court's action as the type of protec-
tionist paternalism it had struck down in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,48 which held inva-
lid Virginia's ban on advertising of prescription drug prices by local 
pharmacists. This condemnation was a remarkable turnaround. 
The Court made it appear paternalistic not to force distributors to 
include the governmental label "propaganda" on their films. 
Secondly, the Court maintained that Keene's first amendment 
claim was "contradicted by history."49 The Court's treatment of 
the legislative history of the Act was relegated to one footnote50 in 
which the Court recited the Act's antiseptic proclamation that its 
policy and purpose are to require 
public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities 
and other activities for or on behalf of ... foreign principals so 
40Jd. 
41 /d. 
42Jd. 
43 /d. at 1870 n.14, 1873. 
44 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See supra text accompanying note 29. 
45 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1871 (emphasis added). 
46Jd. 
47 /d. 
48 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
49 Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1872. 
50 See id. at 1872 n.16. 
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that the Government and the people of the United States may be 
informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their 
statements and actions in the light of their associations and 
activities. 51 
The Court further quoted a House Report which referred to the 
"fundamental approach" of the statute as "one not of suppression 
or of censorship, but of publicity and disclosure."52 To this high-
minded statutory purpose the Court added its conviction that while 
"[t]here is a risk that a partially informed audience might believe 
that a film that must be registered with the Department of Justice is 
suspect,"53 there "is no evidence that this suspicion-to the degree 
it exists-has had the effect of Government censorship."54 
The third reason given by the Court was a more precise recasting 
of its first argument. Whatever negative connotations the term 
"political propaganda" may have in the public mind, the Court was 
required to defer to the term as Congress defined it - and Congress 
had defined it neutrally. "It is axiomatic," the Court argued, "that 
the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of 
that term."55 Congress' use of the term "propaganda," the Court 
insisted, had "no pejorative connotation."56 In a final flourish of 
strict statutory constructionism, the Court admonished: "As judges 
it is our duty to construe legislation as it is written, not as it might 
be read by a layman, or as it might be understood by someone who 
has not even read it."57 
II 
A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. Stigma in the Mind of the Beholder 
The Supreme Court's bottom line in Keene may be distilled in the 
logic that the opprobrium most people attach to the label propa-
ganda is not the government's fault. The government chose a word 
with a range of meanings, some neutral and some negative. If the 
public regards the label as stigmatizing, it is by choice. This echoes 
the reasoning in Plessy v. Ferguson, 58 where the Court was willing to 
51 /d. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611 note (Policy and Purpose)). 
52 /d. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941)). 
53 /d. at 1873. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. 
56Jd. 
57 /d. 
58 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
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accept at face value the transparent claim that if any stigma at-
tached to separate but equal train accommodations, it was only be-
cause blacks chose to treat them that way.59 "We consider the 
underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument," the Court stated in 
Plessy, "to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of 
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. " 60 
Contrary to what every American even in 1896 surely knew to be 
the truth, 61 the Court then pontificated: "If this be so, it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored 
race chooses to put that construction upon it. " 62 The issues in 
Meese v. Keene do not, of course, approach Plessy in magnitude, but 
the method of Plessy's most infamous sentence is indistinguishable 
from the method in Keene and is no more convincing. 
B. The Statutory Language 
The core factual premise of the Court's analysis, that Congress 
intended to use the "neutral version" of the term propaganda, sim-
ply does not withstand scrutiny. The Court's assertion that the stat-
utory definition of a term "excludes unstated meanings of that 
term"63 is irrelevant, for all the pejorative meanings of propaganda 
are stated in the statutory definition. When examined in its com-
plete context, the cold statutory language does not sustain the sani-
tized reading of the Supreme Court but seems instead to be aimed 
quite deliberately at subversive and political speech.64 
S9 Id. at 551. 
60Jd. 
61 Justice John Marshall Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy quite simply declared that 
"(e]very one knows" the real purpose of separate but equal -and, of course, he was 
right: everyone knew. See id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
62 /d. at 551. 
63 Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1873 (1987). 
64 The term 'political propaganda' includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, 
pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person (I) which is 
reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes 
will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce or in 
any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the 
United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or 
relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or 
with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the 
United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, 
advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disor-
der, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any 
other American republic or the overthrow of any government or political sub-
division of any other American republic by any means involving the use of 
force or violence. 
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Justice Stevens' opinion never meaningfully addressed the signifi-
cance of the many emotively supercharged phrases in this statutory 
definition. Note that in his opinion for the court of appeals in the 
Block litigation,65 then-Judge Antonin Scalia did quote from what 
he called the "less savory" elements of the statutory definition.66 
These elements, he said, "to the extent they are not redundant, are 
of course artificial."67 Elaborating, he claimed that it "could hardly 
be contended that classification of speech as 'political propaganda' 
raises these specific unpleasant images in the public mind. " 68 This 
remarkable statement" placed the court in the presumptuous posi-
tion of selectively ignoring parts of the congressional definition of 
"political propaganda" on the grounds that the court considered 
them artificial. 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court's analysis of the statutory lan-
guage was essentially nonexistent. The Court conspicuously failed 
to mention any of the statute's litany of semantically loaded 
phrases, such as "prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce" and 
"promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissen-
sions."69 At the very least, the plaintiffs' claim that the statute was 
aimed at subversive political speech was sufficiently legitimate to 
require a meaningful inquiry beneath the Act's cold language, into 
the legislative history. Scrutiny of the legislative history would 
prove embarrassing, however, for it would have uncovered a con-
gressional preoccupation with speech perceived as politically unde-
sirable. The Supreme Court thus disingenuously read the literal 
statutory language to obviate conducting a thorough examination of 
the legislative history. In short, it misread the statute so as to avoid 
the necessity of misreading its history. 
22 u.s.c. § 6110) (1982). 
65 Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also supra note 5. 
66 The "less savory" ends are promoting " 'racial, religious, or social dissen-
sions,' and communication 'which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes 
any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict 
involving the use of force or violence in any other American republic or the 
overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any other American 
republic by any means involving the use of force or violence.' " 
/d. at 1311 n.2 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6110)). 
67Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d at 1311 n.2. 
68 /d. 
69 22 U.S.C. § 6110). See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Legislative History 
The Keene Court found "unpersuasive, indeed, untenable"70 the 
lower court's interpretation of the statute's "political propaganda" 
language as carrying an "unsavory connotation."" The district 
court found that the statutory scheme constituted "a conscious at-
tempt to place a whole category of materials beyond the pale of 
legitimate discourse."72 Although it rejected the lower court's read-
ing of the legislative history of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 
which merely consisted of a citation to the Act's policy statement 
and one House Report, the Supreme Court engaged in no system-
atic review of that history in its opinion. The Court's failure to 
explore the legislative history is particularly troubling because the 
heart of the Court's ultimate first amendment analysis drives a 
wedge between the word "propaganda," as popularly understood, 
and the supposedly neutral meaning employed by the statute. 
The legislative history, had it been satisfactorily examined, would 
have exposed the Act as being in a long line of xenophobic excess. 
Legislation addressing threatening "foreign" or "alien" speech has 
an ugly history in America, dating as far back as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798.73 The Foreign Agents Registration Act is 
part of that legacy, and from the very beginning of the congres-
sional concern with propaganda, Congress made little effort to dis-
guise its preoccupation with specific ideological viewpoints. 
Congressional concern with propaganda grew out of the experiences 
of World War I and the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 
1918.74 The Senate first investigated German propaganda in Febru-
ary 1919. As Communist propaganda became the focus of inquiry 
in the 1930s, 75 Representative Hamilton Fish rebutted reservations 
of Senator LaGuardia with the high-minded assurance that "[i]t is 
not the purpose of this resolution to interfere with any group except 
70 Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1870 (1987). 
71 !d. at 1870 (quoting Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. III I, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 1985)). 
72 Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. at 1126. The district court also stated, "In the 
present case, the defendants have preferred no justification compelling or otherwise for 
the use of the phrase 'political propaganda.' " !d. at 1125. 
73 I Stat. 570, 596 (1798). See generally J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS- THE 
ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956). 
74 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217; Sedition Act of May 16, 1918, 
ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553. 
75 See H.R. REP. No. 2290, 7lst Cong., 3d Sess. (1930); M. DIES, MARTIN DIES' 
STORY 57 (1963). 
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the communists in the United States."76 
As the 1930s progressed, Congress became increasingly con-
cerned with the awesome propaganda success of the Nazis in Ger-
many and the exportation of that propaganda into the United 
States. Under the direction of Representative Samuel Dickstein, the 
House Immigration Committee in 1933 conducted an inquiry into 
Nazi propaganda, German organizations, and anti-Semitic activi-
ties. 77 In 1934 the House passed a resolution for further investiga-
tion of Nazi propaganda and other activities in the United States.78 
After a series of hearings, the House Committee issued reports rec-
ommending compulsory registration of foreign agents distributing 
propaganda in the United States. 79 
After some success and considerable publicity, Representative 
Dickstein introduced another resolution in January 1937 to investi-
gate all organizations diffusing "un-American propaganda."80 Even 
Representative Fish compared this broadly expanded measure, 
which could be used to punish political criticism from American 
citizens, to the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the motion was eventu-
ally tabled. 81 
A resolution introduced by Representative Martin Dies in April 
1937, however, did pass the House. The resolution established the 
Special Committee on Un-American Activities, with the mandate to 
investigate "the extent, character, and object of un-American prop-
aganda activities in the United States" and "the diffusion within the 
United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is 
instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. " 82 
These congressional efforts in 1937 eventually resulted in the For-
76 W. GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 6 (1968). 
77 /d. at 9. 
78 See H.R. Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 13-14 (1934); H.R. REP. 
No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). 
79 See H.R. REP. No. 200, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); W. GooDMAN, supra note 76, at 10. House Report 153, supra, 
was originally entitled Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda and "evinced a par-
ticular concern with violence and of course with foreign control." Attorney General v. 
Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
80 See W. GoODMAN, supra note 76, at 14. 
8I /d. 
82 /d. at 16 n.5. 
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eign Agents Registration Act of 1938.83 Congressional intent with 
regard to the definition of the critical statutory term "propag~da" 
is revealed in a 1937 House Report stating that propaganda violates 
"the democratic basis of our own American institutions of govem-
ment"84 and that registration 
will publicize the nature of subversive or other similar activities 
of such foreign propagandists so that the American people will 
know those who are engaged in this country by foreign agencies 
to spread doctrines alien to our democratic form of government, 
or propaganda for the purpose of influencing American public 
opinion on a political question. 85 
In perhaps the most revealing statement of congressional purpose, 
the report continued: "We believe the spotlight of pitiless publicity 
will serve as a deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda. We 
feel that our people are entitled to know the sources of any such 
efforts. "86 
The first Foreign Agents Registration Act, the forerunner of the 
current statute, was enacted on June 8, 1938.87 The Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor'and America's entry into World War II resulted in 
amendments to the Act in 1941 and 1942 which further defined 
"political propaganda," required that materials classified as propa-
ganda be labeled to disclose the source of origin, and required that 
copies be provided to the Attorney General rather than the Secre-
tary of State. 88 The purported purpose of the amendments was to 
inform the public and government of the source of the 
83 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (as amended). 
84H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). 
85 /d. 
86 Id. (emphasis added). See also Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1521 (E. D. Cal. 
1983). Justice Blackmon's Keene dissent referred to the House Report, stating: 
[T]he legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress fully intended to 
discourage communications by foreign agents. The Act grew out of the inves-
tigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee, formed in 1934 to 
investigate Nazi propaganda activities in the United States and the dissemina-
tion of subversive propaganda controlled by foreign countries attacking the 
American form of government. The Act mandated disclosure, not direct cen-
sorship, but the underlying goal was to control the spread of propaganda by 
foreign agents. This goal was stated unambiguously by the House Committee 
on the Judiciary: 'We believe that the spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve 
as a deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda.' 
Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1874 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
87 Act of June 8, 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938). 
88 Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248 (1942). See also H.R. REP. No. 1547, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); Amending Act Requiring Registration of Foreign Agents: 
Hearings on H.R. 6045 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
77-th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1941); S. REP. No. 913, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). 
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"propaganda. " 89 
This antiseptic and self-serving declaration of statutory purpose 
is misleading, especially when viewed in light of the legislative his-
tory. Constitutional considerations aside, such an "informational". 
purpose does not require the heavy-handed device of labeling the 
material "political propaganda." 
D. The Spurious Requirement of Illicit First Amendment Intent 
The dichotomy between the supposedly neutral statutory defini-
tion of propaganda and the popular understanding of the term is 
not only historically untenable, it is also legally unpersuasive. 
Unlike claims under the equal protection clause, which must be 
predicated upon discriminatory governmental purpose,90 first 
amendment violations are not restricted to actions grounded in im-
permissible intent.91 If a statute's practical effect discourages pro-
tected speech, it violates the first amendment.92 First amendment 
violations may exist without "evidence of an improper censorial 
motive."93 Indeed, in a case decided only the week before Keene, 
the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed the principle that "[i]llicit 
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First 
Amendment. "94 
The dichotomy employed by the Supreme Court in Keene is in-
consistent with the traditional legal treatment of the communica-
tion process. The best repository of legal tradition in analyzing the 
relationship between the intent of the speaker, the dictionary mean-
ing of the speech, and the recipient's understanding of the speech is 
89 Enacted nine days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the new legislation 
proclaimed, 
It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of this Act to protect the 
national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States 
by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities for 
or on behalf of foreign governments . . . so that the Government and the 
people of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons 
and may appraise their statements and actions in light of their associations 
and activities. 
Act of April 29, 1942, 56 Stat. 249 (1942). 
90 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1766-67 (1987); Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). 
91 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 592 (1983). 
92 Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 
626 ( 1986) (plurality opinion). 
93 Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1727 (1987). 
94 /d. (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 579-80). 
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the law of defamation. When language has a range of possible 
"meanings," some of which are defamatory and some of which are 
innocent, the traditional rule in the law of defamation is that the 
words are to be given a "reasonable construction," defined as the 
manner in which the language would be understood by a reasonable 
recipient of the communication. 95 
Defamation has always been recipient-oriented, emphasizing the 
popular usages of language. 96 Defamatory meaning is not to be de-
termined from the naked words but in light of their context. 97 "The 
meaning of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, 
or mistakenly but reasonably, understands it was intended to ex-
press. "98 The Supreme Court's syllogism turned this rule on its 
head. The Court argued that although propaganda has some mean-
ings which are neutral and some sinister and although it is popu-
larly used and understood in its pejorative sense, when the 
government uses the word, it is somehow presumed to be "clean. " 99 
This is not the way the legal system traditionally views the commu-
nication process, nor is it the way communication works in practice. 
Such a presumption of "cleanliness" also lacks credibility in terms 
of the legislative history, which unmistakenly portrays the congres-
sional purpose as designed to attack "pernicious propaganda." 100 
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 ( 1976) ("The meaning of a commu-
nication is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly, but reasonably, under-
stands that it was intended to express."); R. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 4.06( I]. Illinois 
is the only American jurisdiction that does not follow this "reasonable construction 
rule." See Chapski v. Copley Press, Inc., 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1982). 
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that a · 
written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and 
the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so 
construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reason-
ably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be 
actionable per se. 
/d. See generally Malone & Smolla, The Future of Defamation in Illinois After Colson 
v. Steig and Chapski v. Copley Press, Inc., 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 274-97 (1983). 
96 R. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 4.02[1]; Franklin & Bussell, The Plaintiff's Burden in 
Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 828 (1984). 
97 See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970); Oilman v. 
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 
1162, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371,373-74,402 A.2d 651, 
653 (1979); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 419, 353 N.E.2d 834, 837-38, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (1976); Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d I, 3, 259 
N.W.2d 691, 693 (1977). 
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 (1977). 
99 See Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1869-73 (1987). 
100 See H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 75-89. 
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E. The Court's Failure to Perceive Content Discrimination 
Inherent in the Act 
The Supreme Court's effort to neutralize the term "political prop-
aganda" ignores the heavy presumption against content-based 
speech regulation. 101 "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because 
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 102 The 
Court's misperception of the content-based discrimination issue is 
illustrated by both the practical operation of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act and the events surrounding the Keene litigation. 
1. Applying the Act 
For the Act to work at all, the term "political propaganda" must 
have some meaning. A Department of Justice official, "Chief of the 
Registration Unit of the Internal Security Section of the Criminal 
Division," examines material and decides what is and what is not 
"political propaganda." 103 Only a content-sensitive inquiry will tell 
the governmental· classifier whether the speech is propaganda or 
non propaganda. 104 
Such governmental scrutiny of content, however, is "entirely in-
compatible" with the first amendment. 105 The statutory scheme 
thus does not qualify for the lower level of first amendment scrutiny 
applicable to truly content-neutral regulation, which merely dic-
tates the time, place, or manner of dissemination. 106 The funda-
mental irony of the Supreme Court's position was that as the Court 
labored to neutralize the term "propaganda" by equating it with 
"advocacy," it increasingly left itself open to criticism that an alter-
native label, such as "advocacy," would have accomplished the con-
101 See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1727-28 
(1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); FCC v. League of Women 
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); 
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
102 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (1972). 
103 See Keene, 101 S. Ct. at 864 n.l. 
104 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (enforcement of Pub-
lic Broadcasting Amendments Act forbidding noncommercial, educational radio sta-
tions, receiving funds from the corporation for Public Broadcasting, from engaging in 
editorializing that would require "enforcement authorities [to] necessarily examine the 
content of the message that is conveyed"). 
105 Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1728 (1987). 
106See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
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gressional purpose equally well without the opprobrium popularly 
associated with the term "propaganda." 
2. Response to the Application of the Act 
To appreciate how badly the Court misperceived the content-
based discrimination issue, it is useful to examine in some detail the 
events that surrounded the Canadian film litigation. Those events 
vividly depict the intrusive impact on the free operation of the mar-
ketplace of ideas of a governmental decision to label speech as prop-
aganda. None of the players in the Keene litigation perceived the 
labeling as neutral- not the Canadians, not environmental groups, 
not American film critics or editorial writers, and, if they were can-
did, not the decisionmakers within the Justice Department itself. 
In early July 1982, the NFBC submitted a list of sixty-two films 
which it had distributed in the United States from January 1, 1982, 
until June 30, 1982, to the Department of Justice, as required by the 
Act. In September 1982, the Department of Justice requested re-
view copies of five of those sixty-two films. On January 13, 1983, 
the Justice Department, as previously described, 107 ordered that the 
three NFBC films implicated in the Keene litigation be labeled polit-
ical propaganda and invoked the Act's other disclosure 
requirements. 108 
When press accounts of the action appeared in late February 
1983, the public reaction was immediate and negative. Mitchell 
Block, president of the Direct Cinema Company, the sole United 
States distributor of If You Love This Planet, called the decision 
"scary" and "chilling." 109 William Litwack, head of distribution 
for NFBC, said it was "regrettable, insulting, and shameful." 110 
The New York office of the American Civil Liberties Union called 
the action "blatantly unconstitutional" and pledged to bring suit on 
behalf of the distributors, as it eventually did. 111 
The Department of Justice tried to minimize the significance of 
the decision. Spokesman John Russell denied that it was "a move 
to edit or stifle" the National Film Board of Canada, stating that 
"he was told the action was 'not unique' " but conceded that he had 
107 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
108 See Caulfield, supra note 2, at 27, col. 3. 
109 Peterson, U.S. Labels Three Films Propaganda, The Washington Post, Feb. 25, 
1983, at A6, col. l. 
110 Caulfield, supra note 2, at 27, col. 3. 
Ill Peterson, Canada Asks State Department to Reverse Decision on Three Films, The 
Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1983, at A2, col. 2. 
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"never heard of its being done before." 112 Another Justice Depart-
ment official explained that of the hundreds of foreign films re-
ported to the Department annually, only about twenty-five are 
requested for review, and only about half of those are determined by 
the Department to be political propaganda. 113 That determination 
is based on "common sense." 114 Subsequently, a Justice Depart-
ment press release described the move to label the Canadian films 
political propaganda as a "routine" decision "made solely by career 
attorneys" who may or may not "[possess] any special qualifications 
to judge the propaganda content of films, writings or other 
materials."115 
The Department's initial response failed to quell criticism of the 
labeling decision, and the Department later elaborated its position 
in a letter to selected members of Congress and the news media. 
"Contrary to the uninformed hysteria which has developed in some 
quarters," the letter claimed, "the Justice Department is not cen-
soring any film in this country. Nor is it trying to curtail the dis-
semination of any movie." 116 Rather, the Department analogized 
its labeling decision to truth in packaging laws. 117 Also, in an effort 
to disclaim the uniqueness of the decision on the three Canadian 
films, the Department identified twenty-three other films that had 
been classified as foreign political propaganda during the Reagan 
Administration. These films included Crisis in Rain, another film 
by the NFBC, one film from West Germany, three films from South 
Korea, four from South Africa, six from Japan, and eight from 
Israel. 118 While all of these films had been distributed by countries 
112 Peterson, supra note 109, at Al, col. l. 
113 McFadden, 3 Canadian Films Called 'Propaganda' by U.S., The New York 
Times, Feb. 25, 1983, at C4, col. 5. 
114 Peterson, supra note 111, at A2, col. 4. The official went on to state that the 
Department of Justice reviews "the material to determine the purpose of the dissemina-
tion and what audience was being sought." Id. 
115Jd. 
116 Molotsky, U.S. Identifies 23 Films Labeled as Propaganda, The New York Times, 
Mar. 5, 1983, at 14, col. 6. 
117 Jd. at 14, col. 6. The letter maintained that the 
purpose of the label is to notify viewers that the material is being disseminated 
by a foreign government. It does not comment on the positions adopted by 
the film. The label is disclosure, not unlike the disclosures that are required 
on almost all political advertisements or commercials, or on packages sold in 
supermarkets complying with 'truth in packaging' laws. . . . 
I d. 
118Jd. at col. 5. Among the Israeli films classified as political propaganda was A 
Conversation with Golda Meir. When informed that this film had been among those 
classified as foreign political propaganda, Ehud Gol, Counselor for Information at the 
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which the Reagan Administration considered to be allied with the 
national interest, the Department later added Ballad of a Soldier, 
distributed by Sovexportfilm, a registered agent of the Soviet 
Union. 119 
The Canadian government asked for a clarification or reversal of 
the Justice Department decision 120 to no avail. 121 A spokesperson 
for the Canadian Film Board, underscoring the potential chilling 
effect of the decision, noted that Canada had withdrawn a 1974 film 
from United States distribution when the Nixon Administration 
had classified it as political propaganda. 122 
Acid Rain: Requiem of Recovery? had been circulated in the 
United States for nine months without the required label when the 
Justice Department decision first appeared in the press. Environ-
mental groups were outspoken in their reaction to the decision, not-
ing that it would create a chilling effect on debate over acid rain and 
that it may have been a conscious effort to "retard" public under-
standing of the issue. 123 Editorial opinion in the national press was 
Israeli Consulate General in New York, called the decision "a joke." Molotsky, supra 
note 116, at 14, col. 5. Canadian government officials,. however, were clearly not 
amused, describing the Department's decision as "a throwback to the McCarthy era," 
Peterson, supra note. 111, at AI, col. 1, and "bizarre and petty," U.S. Denounced for 
Labeling 3 Canadian Films as 'Propaganda', Chicago Tribune, Feb. 26, 1983, at 1-2 
(quoting Canadian Environmental Minister, John Roberts). "It sounds like something 
you would expect from the Soviet Union, not the United States," said the Canadian 
Environmental Minister. "The action is an extraordinary interference with freedom of 
speech." /d. Canadian Ambassador Allen Gotlieb said, "[T]his is a democracy, and 
their laws are their laws. . . . But we don't understand how films of that sort, which are 
after all produced in an equally democratic country, can be viewed as political propa-
ganda. We just don't understand it." /d. at 1. 
119 See Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1872 n.l7 ( 1987) (citing Second Declaration 
of Joseph E. Clarkson, Exhibit B, App. 60-63). 
120 Peterson, supra note Ill, at A2, col. 1. 
121 Mr. D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Criminal Jus-
tice Department of the Department of Justice, asked for copies of the films in response 
to the Canadian government's request, reviewed them over the weekend, and upheld the 
decision which classified them as propaganda. See McGrory, Justice Department's Boos 
Make Film Subjects Boffo Box Office, The Washington Post, Mar. I, 1983, at A3, col. 2. 
122 Caulfield, supra note 2, at 27, cols. 4-5. The spokesperson for the NFBC was Ms. 
Sally Bochner; the film involved was That Hoodlum Gang, which examined Canadian 
government response to political protest. 
123 For example, Robert Rose, head of the National Clean Air Coalition, stated that 
"[t]he chilling effect is obvious" and called the Justice Department "film police," pre-
dicting that "the effect will be to deny American voters one of the few opportunities to 
learn about acid rain and make an informed judgment." McFadden, supra note 113, at 
C4, col. 4. According to Rose, 
[t]he Reagan Administration has a conscious policy to retard public under-
standing of acid rain and the need to control acid rain. If this is part of that 
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also uniformly adverse to the Justice Department action against the 
Canadian films, particularly in reference to Acid Rain: Requiem or 
Recovery? 124 The New York Times, for example, stated that the Jus-
tice Department classification was more than a neutral procedural 
action; "[i]t's official action to debase the films." 125 Moreover, the 
Times' Anthony Lewis editorialized that labeling the films propa-
ganda "reflect[ ed] a general and dangerous characteristic of the 
Reagan Administration: a fear of open debate and information, a 
fear of freedom." 126 
Congressional reaction was equally negative. Senator Edward 
Kennedy called the propaganda classification an "inexcusable ac-
tion."127 Representative Jim Leach, in a speech before the House 
of Representatives, said the Justice Department had committed an 
"egregious insult" to Canadians and Americans, and he urged Pres-
ident Reagan and Attorney General William French Smith 
to reverse this childish decision without delay. It may be too 
extreme to label this minor league act of censorship a harbinger 
of McCarthyism, but it sends a chilling message to those Ameri-
cans deeply concerned about environmental issues in general and 
about the ultimate environmental issue - the survival of the 
planet. 128 
The timing of the Justice Department's action placed the State 
Department in an embarrassing position. Earlier in the week of the 
decision, Secretary of State George Schultz announced "Project De-
mocracy," an $85 million overseas publication and information 
campaign which included $850,000 for a magazine entitled Com-
munications Impact to "champion free communications." 129 
/d. 
policy, it goes to the heart of a fundamental American value -the right of the 
people to know about the issues which affect their lives. 
124 Mary McGrory wrote that Acid Rain was a "tactful, neutral, inoffensive presenta-
tion" and that the narration was in a "totally unemotional voice." McGrory, supra note 
121, at A3, col. 5. McGrory maintained that the 
/d. 
Justice Department wizards figured out that President Reagan's principal 
political problems are the scandal at EPA and the nuclear freeze movement, 
and reasoned from that that the thing to do was to keep quiet about them. So 
they have said that it is un-American to be against nuclear war and acid rain. 
125 Film Ruckus, in Slow Motion, The New York Times, Mar. 6, 1983, at l8E, col. 2. 
126 Lewis, Afraid of Freedom, The New York Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A27, col. l. 
127 Peterson, supra note 111, at A2, col. 3. 
128 U.S. Denounced for Labeling 3 Canadian Films as 'Propaganda', Chicago Trib-
une, Feb. 26, 1983, at 2. 
129 Oberdorfer, Lawmakers Voice Skepticism on U.S. 'Project Democracy', The Wash-
ington Post, Feb. 24, 1983, at Al, col. I, A26, col. l. 
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When asked about the· Justice Department's recent action against 
the Canadian films, Schultz said, "Obviously we must stand always · 
for the principles of freedom of expression. But where that leads 
you in this particular case, I'm not ready to say." 13° Charles Wick, 
Director of the United States Information Agency, however, was 
more candid, stating that he did not think the propaganda determi-
nation was a "credible decision," and he urged Congress to change 
the law. 131 
The State Department further exacerbated the controversy, how-
ever, by denying a visa to the widow of Salvador Allende. Ms. Al-
lende had been invited by the Catholic archdiocese of San 
Francisco, Stanford University, and the Northern California Ecu-
menical Council to speak on human rights issues, but the State De-
partment determined that her speeches would be "prejudicial to 
U.S. interests" because she was active in the World Peace Coun-
cil. 132 Representative Fortney H. (Pete) Stark, Jr., responded, 
"This is the damndest thing I've ever heard. Last week we were 
afraid of Canadians and this week we're afraid of widows. I'm be-
ginning to believe that the Reagan administration thinks it cannot 
survive criticism or free discussion of important issues." 133 
3. The Impact on Free Speech 
These events graphically reveal the bankruptcy of the Supreme 
Court's refusal to recognize the propaganda label as content-based 
infringement of free speech. Indeed, the statute's concern with 
130 Peterson, supra note Ill, at A2, col. 2. 
131 Film Ruckus, in Slow Motion, supra note 125, at 18E, col. 2. 
132 Tyler, U.S. Denies Allende Widow Visa for Speech, The Washington Post, Mar. 4, 
1983, at A24, col. 3. 
133 Id. Ironically, the Justice Department's labeling of the films skewed the market-
place of ideas in ways not contemplated by the Department, bringing more attention to 
the films than they might otherwise have received and galvanizing support for their 
environmental messages. The film Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery? was shown on 
Capitol Hill, at League of Women Voter's meetings, and in public schools. Peterson, 
supra note 109, at A6, col. I. All three films were viewed by the Senate Environment 
and Public Works Committee in the Dirksen Office Building; Senator Kennedy an-
nounced plans to show it to his colleagues at the next meeting of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee; and Representative Edward J. Markey made arrangements to have the 
films shown on the congressional close-circuit system which has monitors in all mem-
ber's offices. Peterson, supra note Ill, at A2, cols. 2-3. Certainly attendance was in-
creased by the action. The Biograph Theatre in Georgetown scheduled four special 
showings of If You Love This Planet, and each showing played to a full house. Since the 
required label was not attached to the copy shown by the Biograph, the warning was 
read before each showing and posted at the concession stand. Molotsky, supra note 
116, at 14, col. 6. 
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political propaganda focuses on that part of the speech spectrum 
that has always been regarded as the core of first amendment pro-
tection, that is, speech concerned with political and social contro-
versies. 134 One of the most important first amendment doctrines 
ever developed to safeguard free political expression is that statutes 
may not grant wide administrative discretion to officials charged 
with implementing them precisely because of the fear that, con-
sciously or unconsciously, political bias will affect the official's deci-
sion. 135 Yet, the events surrounding the labeling portray a senior 
Justice Department official in an ideologically zealous administra-
tion taking films on acid rain and nuclear war home over the week-
end to confirm through his "common sense" that they satisfy the 
definition of "political propaganda."136 
The Supreme Court's approach to the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act disregarded one of the central tenants of statutory con-
struction in the first amendment context. When statutes implicate 
speech interests on the basis of content, such statutes must be pre-
cisely tailored to effectuate a compelling congressional purpose so as 
to avoid the first amendment proscription against overly broad reg-
ulation. 137 Even when a statutory purpose is legitimate, "that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental 
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved," 138 
and thus the regulation must be drawn with "narrow specificity."139 
By allowing Department of Justice officials wide discretion to deter-
mine what is or is not propaganda, the Supreme Court ignored this 
fundamental canon, giving the government almost carte blanche 
ability to regulate foreign speech based on its content. 
F. An Empirical Critique 
To assess the plausibility of the Court's assumptions about the 
term "propaganda," the authors undertook an empirical experi-
ment. To measure the popular connotations of the term,· the au-
thors prepared and administered a semantic differential 
questionnaire which used a seven-point Likert Scale to measure 
twenty-five perceptive dimensions of the word "propaganda." The 
134 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. I, 14 (1976). 
135 See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951). 
136 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
137 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305, 306-07 (1940). 
138 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
139 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
Propaganda, Xenophobia, and the First Amendment 277 
subjects consisted of 125 undergraduate students at the University 
of Arkansas who voluntarily participated in the study. The subjects 
ranged in age from 18 to 38, attended high school in twenty-two 
different states, and represented thirty different academic majors. 
Sixty-seven (53.6%) of the subjects were female, and fifty-eight 
( 46.4%) were male. The results of this portion of the study are 
displayed below in Table One. 
DESCRIPTOR l/7 
Passive/ Active 
Weak/Strong 
Un-American/ American 
Illegal/Legal 
Illogical/Logical 
Unbelievable/Believable 
Irrational/Rational 
Ignorant/Informed 
Communist/Capitalist 
Hidden/Obvious 
Subversive/Patriotic 
Wrong/Right 
Harmful/Helpful 
False/True 
Bad/Good 
Undesirable/Desirable 
Degrading/Inspirational 
Confusing/Clear 
Unfair/Fair 
Unjust/Just 
Boring/Interesting 
Dishonest/Honest 
Impure/Pure 
Emotional/Factual 
Biased/Balanced 
Table One 
MEAN 
5.34 
5.33 
4.45 
4.30 
4.26 
4.23 
4.07 
4.01 
3.77 
3.72 
3.68 
3.60 
3.60 
3.55 
3.54 
3.53 
3.50 
3.49 
3.36 
3.32 
3.22 
3.05 
2.98 
2.90 
2.51 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
1.357 
1.349 
1.692 
1.514 
1.373 
1.607 
1.302 
1.329 
1.602 
1.522 
1.406 
1.150 
1.231 
1.286 
1.235 
1.423 
1.354 
1.377 
1.334 
1.168 
1.349 
1.190 
1.055 
1.505 
1.463 
As shown in Table One, the term "propaganda" is not generally 
perceived as a neutral word. Since a scale of 4.00 represented a 
neutral point between semantic poles, the dotted line above indi-
cates the point in which attributed meaning shifted from the term 
on the right to the term on the left in the selected word pairs. The 
subjects in this study thus reported their perceptions of propaganda 
to connotatively include eight positive terms and seventeen negative 
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terms. The positive connotations included indications that the 
word "propaganda" was thought to be active, strong, American, 
legal, logical, believable, rational, and informed. The negative con-
notations of the term included perceptions that propaganda was as-
sociated with the adjectives Communist, hidden, subversive, wrong, 
harmful, false, bad, undesirable, degrading, confusing, unfair, un-
just, boring, dishonest, impure, emotional, and biased. While this 
data suggests that members of the public assign numerous connota-
tive properties to the word "propaganda," the more numerous ad-
verse assumptions suggest that the term does have a generally 
negative meaning for the public, a confirmation of the "cultural evi-
dence" portrayed in the events surrounding the Keene litigation. 
III 
THE SUBLIMINAL MESSAGE OF MEESE V. KEENE: 
YouR "PROPAGANDA" IS OuR 
"INFORMATION" 
A. The United States as Propagandist 
When the Court's position in Keene is replayed, it is possible to 
discern an argument that is stated largely between the lines. The 
Court essentially saw the propaganda label not as a governmental 
restriction on the speech of private citizens but as an exercise by the 
government of its own right to free speech. To fully appreciate the 
importance of this theme in the Supreme Court's opinion, one 
should read it in conjunction with the opinion of Antonin Scalia in 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in the parallel litigation 
over the three films initiated in Washington, D.C., by Mitchell 
Block. 140 
Perhaps aware of the transparent weaknesses in the Court's at-
tempt to neutralize the term "propaganda" in Block, Judge Scalia's 
defense of the Act essentially threw in the towel on neutrality. 
"We know of no case in which the first amendment has been held to 
be implicated by governmental action consisting of no more than 
governmental criticism of the speech's content." 141 According to 
Antonin Scalia, the government is not required to remain mute; it 
may enter the political arena and take stands on controversial is-
sues. 142 The classification and labeling of these films as propaganda 
140 Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986), see supra note 5. In the context 
of his Block opinion, Justice Scalia is referred to in the text as "Judge." 
141 /d. at 1313. 
142 /d. 
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in his view did not constitute regulation of speech but mere partici-
pation by the government as an independent speaker. The "unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas," Judge Scalia argued, is not "one in 
which the government's wares cannot be advertised." 143 
The Supreme Court in Keene made the same argument, in 
slightly different terminology, by claiming that the Act actually en-
hances first amendment values by giving the public more informa-
tion about the films. 144 As previously discussed, the Supreme Court 
went so far as to state that it was the lower court's injunction 
against the operation of the Act which suppressed speech by censor-
ing the message that the films were propaganda. 145 This was an 
implicit restatement of Judge Scalia's argument, for the only speech 
that the injunction could have suppressed was the government's 
speech. The Act was thus made to appear, not as censorship, but as 
a device for adding one more voice to the market, that of the United 
States government. 
This is a complete shift in argumentative tack. The claim is that 
the government has the power to propagandize on its own behalf 
and that it may effectuate its own propaganda efforts by forcing 
other speakers to label their speech as propaganda. The Block 
court's statement that it could find no cases restricting governmen-
tal speech, of course, by no means resolves the question. As Profes-
sors Nowak and Rotunda observed, the absence of case law on 
government propaganda "may be considered a strength rather than 
a weakness of the democratic system, for there has not been a clear 
need for the Court to establish precise limits on propaganda efforts 
by government agencies in the United States." 146 Although there 
have been sporadic court rulings limiting governmental speech 147 
and scholarly commentary arguing that limits do exist, 148 the area 
l43Jd. 
144 Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1871-72 (1987). 
145Jd. at 1871. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
146 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,§ 16.11, at 849 
(1986) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK & YoUNG]. 
147 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (government may 
not restrict broadcast speech on publicly financed television and radio station); Ander-
son v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978) (public funds may not be 
used to influence result of proposed referendum). 
148 See, e.g., NOWAK & YoUNG, supra note 146, § 16.11; Kamenshine, The First 
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979); 
Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda 
in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530, 531· 
536 (1966); Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official 
Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578, 600-04 (1980). 
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remains largely uncharted. 
B. The United States as Speech Regulator 
The distinction between the government as regulator and the gov-
ernment as participant is recognized in constitutional law. In com-
merce clause analysis, for example, it is an established rule that a 
state may not regulate commerce so as to prohibit goods manufac-
tured within the state from being sold outside the state. 149 If the 
state owns the factory and manufactures the goods as part of a 
state-owned business, however, the state is not treated as a market 
regulator but as a market participant, and in that capacity, it may 
refuse to sell the goods to out-of-state buyers. 150 By analogy, the 
same distinction might apply in the speech context: the government 
enjoys greater latitude as a participant in the speech market than as 
a regulator of that market. 
The analogy to the commerce clause cases may seem far-fetched, 
but the comparison is apt. States are exempted from normal com-
merce clause restrictions when they act as market participants be-
cause, as mere participants, they do not impede private trade in the 
national marketplace. 151 
The instant that a state begins to exert influences on the market 
that reach beyond whatever force it naturally commands as a com-
petitor, however, the Court has stripped it of its commerce clause 
immunity. 152 In the marketplace, participants exert reciprocal re-
straints on each other through pressures created by competitive 
pricing, quality differences, advertising, or consumer loyalties. 
However, when the state affects the behavior of actors in the market 
in ways that no other buyer or seller may, the natural reciprocity of 
the free market no longer exists. In essence, the state requires con-
duct of other actors in the market that those actors have no power 
to require of the state. When a state ceases to merely deal for its 
own account and begins to police the deals of others, it acts as a 
regulator and is thus subject to the limitations of the commerce 
clause. 
149 See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). 
ISO Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980). 
lSI Id. at 437. Further, "[t]here is no constitutional plan to limit the ability of the 
states themselves to operate freely in the free market." /d. 
152 See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97-98 
(1984). In South-Central, the State of Alaska attempted to contractually require pur-
chasers of state timber to use in-state processors. The Court invalidated such a restric-
tion of post-purchase activity of the purchaser. /d. 
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The touchstone of the regulator/participant dichotomy is 
whether the government is merely behaving with the powers of a 
private actor or whether it is exercising functions only within the 
capacity or authority of the government. 1s3 Anyone may criticize a 
film; anyone may label a film "political propaganda." If George 
Schultz or Edwin Meese had criticized these films in an official gov-
ernmental press release, or in a public speech, or in an article 
printed in the New York Times, then the government would be act-
ing in a manner largely indistinguishable from any other participant 
in the marketplace of ideas. Although it is not inconceivable that 
such "participatory" activity might at some point raise first amend-
ment objections (an issue impossible to confidently resolve in the 
absence of case law), such speech arguably is less constitutionally 
restricted than outright regulation. 
In administering the Foreign Agents Registration Act's require-
ments, however, the government is plainly not operating as a pure 
participant but as a regulator. The government functions in a man-
ner foreclosed to other participants: it imposes classification, label-
ing, and disclosure requirements directly upon the speech of other 
participants. No other movie producer, distributor, or exhibitor has 
any corresponding power to label other competing speech. Woody 
Allen has no power to impose labels or disclosure lists on the films 
of Steven Speilberg. Conversely, the Keene decision may so em-
power the government. When the movie Missing was released, for 
example, the State Department issued a "white paper" condemning 
the premise of the film, which was critical of United States action in 
Chile. 1s4 Taken to its logical conclusion, Congress, in applying 
Keene, could empower the State Department to order the label 
"propaganda" attached to all copies of Missing. When the govern-
ment imposes requirements such as those of the Foreign Agents Re-
gistration Act, it is acting as only a market regulator can act, and, 
notwithstanding the Keene and Block opinions, when it acts in that 
capacity, it is regulating the marketplace of ideas. 
When seen in these terms, compelled propaganda labeling is 
incompatible tension with the principle established in Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, Iss where the Court struck down Flor-
153 See South-Central, 467 U.S. at 97 (1984) (The Court indicated that a state may 
only place burdens on a market in which it is participating.). The burdens in the South-
Central context, however, were clearly competitive, not regulatory. 
i54See R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS, 138-59 (1986). 
155 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Miami Herald principle does not apply in the context of 
broadcast journalism but only because of the special problem of spectrum scarcity and 
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ida's compulsory "right-of-reply" statute which granted political 
candidates a right to equal space in order to respond to criticism. 
The Miami Herald could not be forced to print a candidate's reply, 
the Supreme Court held, for that would place the government in the 
impermissible position of dictating the content of the newspaper, an 
unconstitutional encroachment on editorial prerogative. 156 The 
Court found the forced carriage of another's message by a private 
speaker repugnant to first amendment values; the speaker (the 
Miami Herald) had a right to print its message unvarnished by gov-
ernmental requirements of "balance."157 
Likewise, more recently in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of California, 158 the Court declared that com-
pelling a privately owned utility to provide access for third-party 
speech with which it disagreed would violate the company's first 
amendment rights. According to Justice Powell, an order mandat-
ing consumer group advocacy access to the company's billing enve-
lopes would force the company to "alter [its] speech to conform 
with an agenda they do not set." 159 A forced response to the third-
party speech, to prevent the assumption that they agreed with the 
message they were forced to distribute, would be antithetical to the 
free and uninhibited discussion which the first amendment seeks to 
foster. 160 Moreover, the courts have consistently upheld the first 
amendment rights of privately owned media to exclude even paid 
editorial advertising by third parties in both broadcast161 and print 
media. 162 The Justice Department's arguments and the courts' de-
cisions in Block and Meese ignored this line of reasoning and seem-
ingly reversed these principles when the government sought 
compulsory third-party access for its speech, thus altering the 
agenda and transforming the dialogue to a trialogue. 
Indeed, the only analogous first amendment precedent for per-
mitting the government to force private speakers to carry messages 
against their will exists in the commercial advertising context. For 
instance, the lender may be forced to disclose finance rates or the 
the public trustee status of broadcast licensees. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). 
156Miami Herald Publishing Co., 418 U.S. at 258. 
157 See id. 
158 475 U.S. I (1986). 
159 Jd. at 9. 
160 Jd. at 15-16. 
161 Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
162 Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Trib-
une Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). 
Propaganda, Xenophobia, and the First Amendment 283 
cigarette manufacturer forced to carry a health warning because of 
the substantially lower first amendment protection accorded to 
commercial speech. 163 Government may paternalistically require 
truth in advertising because regulation of speech proposing com-
mercial transactions may be inextricably intertwined with regula-
tion of the commercial transaction itself. 164 Indeed, the 
government may attempt to influence commercial conduct ob-
liquely by choosing to regulate speech about commercial transac-
tions, even when it leaves the underlying commercial activity 
unregulated. 165 
The Foreign Agents Registration Act proceeds under precisely 
this "truth in advertising" model by imposing labels on speech 
while not directly restricting distribution or exhibition. The Act, 
however, imposes its requirements on political speech rather than 
on commercial speech; it is not a truth in advertising statute but a 
truth in politicking statute. Therefore, since no diminished first 
amendment commercial speech standards pertain to the Act and 
since it is not sustainable under the conscientious application of 
those standards that tlo pertain, the Act impermissibly regulates 
speech. 
CONCLUSION: OF XENOPHOBIA, DOUBLESPEAK, 
AND DOUBLE STANDARDS 
The almost brazen duplicity inherent in the Court's insistence 
that "propaganda" is a neutral term is highlighted by the scrupu-
lous avoidance of the "P-word" by those various agencies of the 
United States which have historically been charged with imple-
menting America's own propaganda efforts. In 1917, for example, 
President Wilson by Executive Order created the "Committee on 
Public Information," also known as the Creel Committee, to con-
duct American propaganda efforts. 166 Creel specifically chose the 
term "information" and avoided the word "propaganda" because 
l63 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 
328, 340 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 
557, 562-63 (1980). The statement that commercial speech is the only analogous prece-
dent for not following the Miami Herald principle excludes, of course, the special rules 
applicable to broadcasters. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
164 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 462. 
165 To satisfy the special first amendment standard for commercial speech, the gov-
ernment's interest must be "substantial," the restrictions must "directly advance" that 
interest, and the restrictions must be "no more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs., 478 U.S. at 340. 
166 See generally G. CREEL, How WE ADVERTISED AMERICA (1920). 
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"that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with de-
ceit and deception." 167 Likewise, during the administration of 
Franklin Roosevelt, when the Foreign Agents Registration Act was 
in its incipiency, the "Office of Facts and Figures" was created. In 
1942, Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan "Coordinator of In-
formation," created the "Office of War Information," and estab-
lished the "United States Information Service." 168 Thus, at the 
same historical moment when the United States government en-
acted its legislation concerning foreign "propaganda," it established 
its own concentrated effort to propagate "information." The word 
choice was clearly deliberate, for history and experience had already 
made the term "propaganda" a term of opprobrium. As one ana-
lyst wrote, 
in the twenties and thirties it was customarily used in a disparag-
ing sense, equating, in the eyes of cynics, the methods and merits 
of the Allied and the German sides in World War I. It was in 
that war that propaganda lost its former religious meaning and 
acquired a sudden new importance as 'psychological warfare.' 169 
The pattern continued during the Cold War that began in the 
1950s, leading to the establishment of the "United States Informa-
tion Agency." 170 In a 1953 letter to President Eisenhower from 
USIA Director Theodore C. Streibert, the new Director said the 
Agency would be "avoiding a propagandistic tone" and would in-
stead "concentrate on objective, factual news reporting and appro-
priate commemaries." 171 As an historian of United States 
propaganda efforts noted, 
[w]e call this our 'information program'; others call it propa-
ganda. That label, in this century, has become widely distasteful. 
Most Americans identify it with Hitler's 'big lie,' [and] Soviet 
speeches in the United Nations .... To propagandize means in 
many minds to lie, to exaggerate, to manipulate, to subvert. So 
the U.S. Government employs a euphemism. 172 
In the summer of 1987 the nation watched the skill of govern-
mental euphemism raised to high art in the Iran/Contra Hearings. 
167 T. SORENSEN, THE WORD WAR: THE STORY OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA 6 
(1968). 
168 !d. at 9-10. 
169 L. BOGART, PREMISES FOR PROPAGANDA: THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION 
AGENCY'S OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE COLD WAR xviii (1976). 
170 For background on the creation of the USIA, see J. HENDERSON, THE UNITED 
STATES INFORMATION AGENCY 52-53 (1969). 
171 T. SORENSEN, supra note 167, at 50. 
172 Jd. at 3. 
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Keene v. Meese was an unhappy endorsement of one of the central 
tragic habits of mind that contributed to the Iran/Contra scandal: 
the theory that the American people cannot be told the real truth 
about foreign events, that they need the government to subtract and 
add to that truth for the higher cause of national security. As with 
the Iran/Contra affair, however, not everyone was fooled. If a 
member of the public tried to inform himself of the Supreme 
Court's decision by reference to the United States Supreme Court 
Digest, he would find the alphabetical listing for "propaganda," 
which reads: "PROPAGANDA see Sedition and Subversive Activ-
ities." That entry states: 
SEDITION AND SUBVERSIVE ACfiVITIES Scope of Topic: 
This topic covers the offense of inciting discontent or resistance 
against the government, and cases arising under statutes directed 
against various subversive and antisocial activities affecting the 
national security; including sabotage, and requirements as to the 
registration and reports of agents of foreign principals. 173 
There is a certain ironic (and honest) justice in that entry. 
1?3 12A UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DIGEST, LAWYER'S EDITION 77 (1987). 
